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Abstract 
 The purpose of this paper is to explain why voters made the choices that they did in 
Britain's Alternative Vote referendum on May the 5th 2011.  The paper utilises four 
alternative theoretical models to analyze individual voting behaviour.  They are described as 
the cost-benefit, cognitive engagement, heuristics and mobilisation models.  The explanatory 
power of these models is investigated using a large survey data set gathered in the AV 
Referendum Study conducted in conjunction with the British Election Study.  Multivariate 
analyses show that all four models contribute to explaining why some people, but not others, 
voted in favour of electoral reform, with the cost-benefit model exhibiting particularly strong 
effects.  The conclusion discusses public reactions to the referendum and possible 
implications of the decisive rejection of electoral reform.  
.
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Britain Says NO:  Voting in the AV Ballot Referendum 
 The referendum on the Alternative Vote electoral system held on May 5th 2011 was 
the first nationwide referendum held in the UK since 1975 when the vote on continued 
membership of the European Community took place.  The AV referendum arose out of the 
Coalition Agreement signed between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats after the 
inconclusive general election of 2010.  Negotiations on this issue were difficult because the 
Conservatives had opposed any change to the electoral system in their manifesto which 
promised to keep the first-past-the-post system (Conservative Party, 2010).  In contrast, the 
Liberal Democrats called for a fully proportional electoral system in their manifesto (Liberal 
Democrats, 2010).  In the end the two parties agreed a compromise, which was to hold a 
referendum on the Alternative Vote system, while acknowledging that they would campaign 
on opposite sides of the debate.  It was a compromise which neither party really wanted, but 
which was reached in order to make the Coalition Agreement possible (Bogdanor, 2011; 
Norton, 2011).   
The Parliamentary Voting Systems and Constituencies Bill introduced the legislation 
necessary to make the referendum possible.  As the bill went through Parliament in October 
2010, Caroline Lucas the newly elected Green Party MP for Brighton proposed an 
amendment which offered voters a choice of three different electoral systems in the 
referendum (Bogdanor, 2011: 94). But this was rejected and the deal agreed between the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats was preserved in the Bill.  The referendum question 
read: 
Do you want the United Kingdom to adopt the ‘alternative vote’ system instead of the current 
‘first past the post’ system for electing Members of Parliament to the House of Commons?’   
After criticism by the Electoral Commission that this question was too difficult to understand, 
the wording was changed to read: 
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 ‘At present, the UK uses the 'first past the post' system to elect MPs to the House of 
Commons.  Should the 'alternative vote' system be used instead?' 
In the event, when the vote took place on May 5th, the referendum proposal was 
decisively rejected—32 per cent of the voters supported a change in the electoral system and 
68 per cent opposed it, with a turnout of 42 per cent (Electoral Commission, 2011).     
The purpose of this paper is to explain why voters made the choices that they did in 
the referendum.  The paper utilises four alternative theoretical models to explain individual 
voting behaviour.  We designate them as the ‘cost-benefit’, ‘cognitive engagement’, 
‘heuristics’ and ‘mobilisation’ models, and they are described below.  The models are tested 
using data from the AV Referendum Study conducted in conjunction with the British 
Election Study1 (BES).  The paper begins with a theoretical discussion based on previous 
research, paying particular attention to explanations of why people vote in favour or against 
referendum propositions.  The next section discusses the measurement of predictor variables 
specified in the four models.  Then, we test the models using a multivariate analysis of 
referendum voting, and present data on public reactions to how the rival referendum 
campaigns were conducted.  The conclusion discusses implications of the referendum for 
possible future reforms of the British political system.       
Theoretical Perspectives 
 Referendums have been a topic of interest to political scientists for many years, and 
there are several overview volumes of research in the field (e.g., Butler and Ranney, 1994; 
Bowler and Donovan, 1998; Farrell and Schmitt-Beck, 2002; LeDuc, 2003; de Vrees, 2007).  
Alongside these collections are a number of case studies of particular referendums which 
have been held in different countries at different points of time (e.g., Clarke and Kornberg, 
1994; Vowles, 1995; Blais et al., 1996; Marcussen and Zolner, 2001; LeDuc, 2005).  One 
important topic considered is why referendums take place.  The dominant explanation sees 
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referendums as the product of an elite-level game conducted by rational actors, i.e., party 
strategists and leaders whose aim is to maximise their legislative representation (Boix, 1999; 
Benoit, 2004).  Although interesting, these accounts tend to neglect the role of the voters who 
are treated largely as spectators in the elite-level contests.   
However, it is not difficult to conceive of ways in which voters might get involved in 
such games as players who demand electoral or constitutional reforms.  In a rational choice 
account voters will support a change in the political system if the benefits, as they see them, 
outweighed the costs of reform.  Accordingly, the first of theoretical explanation we consider, 
the ‘cost-benefit’ model, takes such an approach to explaining why people voted to support or 
oppose the proposed change in the UK electoral system.  Put simply, voters who opted to 
change to AV did so because they judged that the benefits of the new system outweighed its 
costs.  
 Rational choice accounts of the vote have been criticized because they make very 
strong assumptions about voters' cognitive capacities and decision-making abilities (e.g., 
Conlisk, 1996; Green and Shapiro, 1996).  In this regard, a large number of survey 
respondents said that they did not understand the AV system and did not know how they were 
going to vote in the AV referendum.  Regarding the latter, Figure 1A shows trends in vote 
intentions from January to early May 2011 using data from published public opinion polls 
and BES monthly surveys.  In January about a third of the respondents said that they did not 
know if they supported or opposed a change in the electoral system.  The size of the ‘don’t 
know’ group declined over time but it was still running at about a fifth of the electorate two 
weeks before the balloting.  This pattern is echoed in Figure 1B which displays data from the 
BES AV Referendum Study panel survey (described below) to track daily movements in 
support/opposition to AV in the month before the vote.  This figure indicates that in early 
April between one-fifth and one-quarter of the respondents were uncertain about what they 
                                             
 
5
would do, and it was only in the last fortnight of the campaign that the number of 'don't 
knows' fell below 15 per cent as the number intending to vote No surged upward. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 Evidence concerning voters' levels of knowledge about the AV electoral system and 
politics more generally is also relevant.  In this regard, a majority (51 per cent) of respondents 
in a BPIX survey conducted just over a week before the referendum said that they only 
partially understood AV or did not understand it at all2.  Such ignorance or indifference 
should prompt abstention according to a rational choice explanation of participation (Downs, 
1957; Whiteley, 1995).  However, as Figure 2 documents, sizable minorities of people with 
very low levels of political knowledge nonetheless voted in support of a change in the 
electoral system3.  Taken together, these survey data suggest that it is useful to consider other 
explanations of the vote in addition to a rational choice account.  
(Figure 2 about here) 
 A second theoretical approach explains referendum voting with reference to people's 
cognitive engagement with politics (Norris, 2000; Clarke et al., 2004, 2009; Dalton, 2008).  
The cognitive engagement model claims that individuals participate if they have the ability 
and motivation to do so.  Levels of knowledge and engagement with the political process are 
likely to be important factors in explaining involvement.  Thus, if individuals are highly 
educated and knowledgeable they are likely to have the ability to participate in the sense of 
understanding how politics works and what it does to resolve societal conflicts.  Equally, if 
people are interested in politics in general or in electoral reform in particular, then they are 
likely to have the motivation to vote in the referendum.   
The cognitive engagement model has implications for how people voted in the 
referendum.  Clearly, if individuals are not engaged with the debate over reform or do not 
understand the proposed system, then they are less likely to cast a ballot, although unlike in a 
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rational choice account there is no presumption that they will always abstain.  But, there is 
another effect at work too arising from the model.  Evidence from a number of referendums 
in different countries suggests that there is a status quo bias, i.e., a tendency for people to 
vote against any change called for in a referendum (Nadeau, Martin and Blais, 1999; LeDuc, 
2003; Clarke, Kornberg and Stewart, 2004)4.  If people are not politically engaged and have 
little understanding of a proposed change, but nonetheless feel that they have a duty to vote, 
an easy solution to their choice problem is to support the status quo.  This conjecture is 
consistent with research in experimental economics shows that individuals tend to be risk 
averse—weighing perceived costs more heavily than possible benefits when faced with a 
choice, the consequences of which are uncertain (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky, 1984; Thaler 
1994).  In the present context, the implication is that political engagement and knowledge 
should encourage individuals to vote Yes and disengagement should encourage the opposite 
response.  So a prediction from the cognitive engagement model is that knowledgeable and 
engaged individuals will have a tendency to support a change to the electoral system and, 
accordingly, will vote in favour of AV. 
 The heuristics model complements the cognitive engagement model.  In this case the 
idea is that when faced with uncertainty and complexity in decision-making, individuals use 
heuristics or ‘rules of thumb’ as cues which simply their choices.  If a person is unsure of 
what to do in the referendum, an alternative strategy to just saying no would be to look for 
guidance from a trusted source such as a political party or a party leader (e.g., Popkin, 1991; 
Sniderman et al., 1991).  For example, Conservative party identifiers and people with positive 
images of David Cameron might decide to vote No because of advice given by the Prime 
Minister or other senior Conservatives who have voiced their opposition to AV.  The use of 
leader and partisan heuristics has been examined in analyses of electoral choice and their 
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importance has been documented in numerous studies (e.g., Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 
1991; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Clarke et al., 2004, 2009).   
Such heuristics traditionally have been seen as imperfect alternatives to full 
information processing of the type which would take place if individuals had the time and 
resources to concentrate fully on the problem.  In this view, the classical decision-making 
model is optimal and heuristics represent a deviation from this ‘gold standard’ (see, e.g., 
Keeney and Raiffa, 1993; Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000).  However, recent research has shown 
that ‘fast and frugal heuristics’ can be as or more effective than full information processing in 
many real-world decision-making situations (Gigerenzer, 2008; see also Conlisk, 1996).  This 
is because in reality decision-making is either too complex or too slow for effective choices 
to be made using classical utility maximization5.  In the context of a national referendum 
campaign where political stakes are high and consequences of alternative outcomes are 
uncertain, it makes sense for voters to take advice from individuals and organisations they 
know and trust, such as political leaders and political parties.    
 The fourth theoretical perspective, the mobilisation model, captures the impact of 
campaigning on voting in the referendum.  There is now an extensive literature showing that 
campaigning has a significant impact on turnout and party choice in general elections (e.g., 
Seyd and Whiteley, 1992; Pattie, Fieldhouse and Johnston, 1995; Green and Gerber, 2004).  
Similar to a general election, the AV referendum was characterized by considerable 
campaign activity.  The pro-reform campaign operated under the rubric of the ‘Yes to Fairer 
Votes’ and the anti-reform campaign worked under the ‘No to AV’ banner.  Both 
organizations sought to mobilize support from different political parties and interest groups as 
well as from various celebrities, media commentators, and opinion leaders.  According to the 
mobilisation model, exposure to either of these rival campaigns should influence voters.  
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To summarize, we expect people to be more likely to vote Yes in the AV referendum 
if they thought the benefits of change outweighed the costs.  A similar expectation arises if 
they are knowledgeable and engaged both with politics in general and the referendum 
campaign in particular.  Many people rely on partisan and leader heuristics to guide their 
political choices and, accordingly, party identifications and party leader images should have 
influenced referendum voting.  Finally, contact by the Yes or the No campaigns should have 
affected how people voted.  In the next section we discuss various predictor variables used to 
test these hypotheses.       
Measuring Predictor Variables 
 The data used to test the models presented above were gathered in a two-wave panel 
survey that was the centrepiece of the British Election Study's AV Referendum Study.  The 
first wave of the survey was carried out during the referendum campaign (from April 5th to 
May 4th 2011) and the second wave went into the field immediately after the vote.  The 
survey was conducted on the internet,6 and it has a large number of cases (pre-referendum N 
= 22,124, post-referendum N = 18,556) to facilitate tracking the dynamics of public opinion 
in the run-up to the balloting7 and detailed investigation of forces affecting the behaviour of 
various groups.  All predictor variables used in the present analyses, with the exception of the 
campaign contact and constitutional reform variables, were measured in the first (pre-
referendum) wave of the panel survey.  Data on the dependent variable, voting yes or no in 
the referendum, were gathered in the second (post-referendum) wave.  This measurement 
strategy helps to address possible simultaneity biases which can threaten the validity of 
statistical analyses, since it is unlikely that a variable measured after the referendum was over 
influenced one measured before it took place.8   
 Predictor variables in cost-benefit model are based on responses to a set of statements 
which probed opinions about the pros and cons of the alternative vote (AV) and first-past-the 
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post (FPTP) electoral systems.  These variables are direct measures of individual perceptions 
of the costs and benefits of electoral reform.  There is also a battery of indicators tapping 
attitudes about wider constitutional reform issues which arose in the general election of 2010, 
and which could have influenced attitudes towards a change in the electoral system.  
Electoral reform was only one of several proposals for constitutional change discussed in the 
general election.  Inter alia, these proposals include an elected House of Lords, reduction in 
the number of MPs in the House of Commons and devolution of powers from Whitehall to 
local governments.  Opinions about these wider issues are probed to determine the extent to 
which preferences for electoral reform are driven, in part, by more general attitudes about the 
need for change in Britain's political system9.   
(Table 1 about here) 
 Judgments about the possible costs and benefits of electoral reform as reflected in 
opinions about the advantages and disadvantages of the AV and FPTP electoral systems are 
displayed in Table 110.  These data show that the survey respondents are somewhat 
ambiguous about the advantages of AV with about 40 per cent believing that it is fairer and 
about the same proportion thinking the opposite.  Similar ambiguity extends to the idea that 
AV gives too much influence to small parties and also to the argument that the results of AV 
elections more accurately represent public opinion.  Interestingly, the only statement eliciting 
majority agreement (56 per cent) is that the first-past-the-post system enhances effective 
attribution of responsibility to political parties.   
 An exploratory factor analysis of these variables yielded a single factor which 
explains 58.1 per cent of the item variance.  Factor scores from this analysis are used to 
measure opinion about the relative merits of the rival electoral systems.  The several variables 
in the factor analysis are coded so that a high factor score indicates a favourable opinion 
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towards AV in comparison with FPTP.  Respondents with higher factor scores see relatively 
more benefits and fewer costs associated with a change in the electoral system.   
 Regarding constitutional change more generally, the manifestos of all three major 
parties gave considerable attention to this topic during the 2010 general election.  This was 
largely a response to the widely publicized MPs' expenses scandal, which exercised press and 
public alike and drew attention to the issue of constitutional reform.  The Liberal Democrats 
responded by calling for an elected House of Lords, a change to a proportional representation 
electoral system, more parliamentary scrutiny and a variety of other reforms (Liberal 
Democrats, 2010).  The Conservatives' manifesto had a long section on the ‘Big Society’ 
which called for greater volunteering and the devolution of powers from Whitehall to local 
communities.  Their manifesto also called for a reduction in the number of MPs to 600 and 
for the strengthening of civil liberties (Conservative Party, 2010).  For its part, the Labour 
manifesto advocated fixed-term parliaments, strengthening of local government, and Lords 
reform (Labour Party, 2010).  As a result, the AV referendum campaign occurred in a context 
in which constitutional reform had been on the agenda since the preceding general election a 
year earlier.  With this in mind, we asked respondents a battery of questions about possible 
reforms to the British political system.  
 The responses (see Table 2) reveal widespread support for an elected House of Lords 
(61 per cent agreed), and a reduction in the number of MPs in the House of Commons to 600 
(70 per cent agreed).  There also was considerable agreement (58 percent) that local 
government should have more powers and strong opposition to the abolition of the monarchy 
(71 per cent disagreed).  The idea of using referendums to decide important issues was 
popular as well, as was retention of the Church of England as a state church.    
 A factor analysis of these variables yielded two distinct factors which jointly 
explained 51.7 per cent of the item variance.  The variables measuring opinion on an elected 
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Lords, a smaller Commons, more powers to local government and more referendums to 
decide important issues loaded strongly on a factor which we label ‘greater democracy’ since 
a high score denotes support for all these reforms.  Variables measuring opinions regarding 
the monarchy and Church of England load strongly on the second factor indicating, not 
surprisingly, that support for the monarchy is strongly associated with opposition to a change 
in the status of the church.  We label this factor ‘traditionalism’11.  The expectation is that the 
democracy and traditionalism factors will have positive and negative impacts respectively, on 
the likelihood of casting a Yes ballot in the AV referendum.  
(Table 2 about here) 
 Predictor variables in the cognitive engagement model include education, political 
knowledge, political interest and media consumption.  Education and political knowledge are 
measures of people's ability to process information about politics and the extent to which they 
possess such information.  Interest and media exposure gauge their willingness to try to 
understand it.  The political knowledge scale introduced in Figure 2 above was constructed 
using a set of eight factual questions about British politics.  Responses indicate that political 
knowledge is not especially high, since the mean score on the 0-8 scale was 4.7.  This should 
be interpreted in the light of the fact that if individuals randomly guessed the answers to these 
true/false questions they would be expected to get a score of 4 by chance alone.  Interest in 
the AV referendum and wider attention to politics in Britain were measured by 11-point 
scales ranging from 0 (low interest/attention) to 10 (high interest/attention).  
Regarding media exposure, three questions asked respondents how much attention 
they paid to the referendum campaign in newspapers, on television and radio, and on the 
internet.  Answers to these questions reveal that only small numbers of people monitored the 
campaign closely.  Specifically, 8 per cent said that they paid a 'great deal' of attention to the 
campaign in newspapers; 10 per cent said this about television or radio, and 8 per cent, about 
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the internet.  Larger groups—ranging from 35 per cent for the internet to 39 per cent for 
newspapers to 49 per cent for TV and radio—indicated that they gave 'some' attention to the 
campaign.  A media exposure variable was constructed by cumulating these responses into an 
overall index scored such that a high score indicates greater exposure to news about the 
referendum in the media and a low score indicates the opposite.   
 The heuristics model focuses on party leader images and partisanship.  Leader images 
were measured via 11-point 'like'-'dislike' scales which provide excellent summaries of the 
impressions people have of political leaders (Clarke et al., 2009: ch. 5).  If people trust a 
leader, think that he is strong, capable and listens to ordinary people then they will tend to 
like him, and these feelings play an important role in influencing their voting behaviour.  
Both Nick Clegg and Ed Miliband campaigned in favour of a change in the electoral system 
and David Cameron campaigned against it.  Thus, liking Clegg or Miliband should encourage 
individuals to support electoral reform and liking Cameron should encourage them to oppose 
it.  This said, Clegg's ability to convince large numbers of people to vote Yes was doubtful 
because his standing with the public had fallen sharply since before May 2010 election.  
Basking in the glow of 'Cleggmania' just before the general election, his average 'likeability' 
rating on a 0-10 scale was a robust 5.6; a year later it had fallen nearly two full points to a 
very mediocre 3.7.  Nor were Miliband or Cameron warmly received—in the run-up to the 
referendum their likeability scores were 4.2 and 4.4, respectively.  Possible aggregate-level 
consequences of these ratings aside, Figure 3 illustrates that leader images have sizable and 
predictable individual-level correlations with the likelihood of voting Yes in the referendum. 
(Figure 3 about here) 
Turning to partisanship, the Liberal Democrats and the Conservatives took strong and 
opposing stands in the referendum campaign.  However, Labour was in an ambiguous 
position since it was split on the issue. Although Labour Leader, Ed Miliband and a number 
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of his shadow cabinet colleagues spoke in favour of AV, prominent senior Labour politicians 
including Margaret Beckett, John Prescott and John Reid argued publicly to keep FPTP.  This 
suggests that the partisan heuristic should work well for the Liberal Democrats and 
Conservatives, but not as well for Labour because the party was sending a mixed message.  
Empirically, this appears to be the case—among those casting a ballot, 80 per cent of Liberal 
Democrat identifiers voted Yes in the referendum and fully 88 per cent of Conservative 
identifiers voted No.  However, Labour partisans were closely divided, with 46 per cent 
voting No and 54 per cent voting Yes.  
 The fourth model emphasizes the importance of mobilising voters by campaigning.  A 
straightforward indicator is whether a respondent was contacted by the ‘Yes to Fairer Votes’ 
and the ‘No to AV’ campaigns.  The data reveal that 22 per cent of the survey respondents 
were contacted by the former campaign, and 29 per cent were contacted by the latter one.  
Slightly less than one person in five (19 per cent) were contacted by both campaigns.  Yes 
voting among those contacted by the Fairer Votes campaign only was eight per cent greater 
than among those contacted by the No to AV campaign only, and 15 per cent greater than 
among those who were not contacted by either campaign.  Below, we investigate if this 
pattern persists in a multivariate model with controls for other possible influences on the 
vote.  
  In addition to the various indicators used to specify the four explanatory models, 
several socio-demographic variables were included as controls in the multivariate analysis.  
These variables were age, gender, and annual family income.  In addition, dummy variables 
for residence in Scotland and Wales12 were employed to proxy other possible factors 
affecting referendum voting in these countries.   
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Modelling Referendum Voting 
 Parameters in the multivariate model of voting in the AV referendum were estimated 
using a binomial logit regression analysis, since the dependent variable was a dummy 
variable with Yes voters scored 1 and No voters scored zero (Borooah, 2002).  As shown in 
Table 3, the scale measuring AV's perceived costs and benefits has a large, statistically 
significant, impact (p < .001) on the probability of casting a Yes vote.  The democracy and 
traditionalism scales also have highly significant impacts (p < .001) and, as expected, 
opposite signs.  Taken together, these results indicate that calculations of the costs and 
benefits of AV and more general attitudes towards constitutional change significantly 
influenced the vote.  As hypothesized, people who judged that the AV system was an 
improvement over FPTP or who favoured wider constitutional reforms tended to vote ‘Yes’. 
In contrast, those who preferred FPTP or were supporters of traditional British political 
institutions tended to vote ‘No’.   
(Table 3 about here) 
Some of the variables associated with the cognitive engagement model also exercised 
significant effects on the probability of a Yes vote.  Specifically the hypotheses that 
heightened interest in the campaign, greater knowledge of politics and higher levels of 
education enhance the likelihood of a Yes vote are confirmed (p < .001).  These findings are 
consistent with the argument that disengaged, less well informed and poorly educated 
individuals who nonetheless decided to cast a ballot were likely to vote against change, 
thereby contributing to the status quo bias in the outcome.   
Predictor variables associated with the heuristics and campaign contact models 
behave as expected as well.  Thus, liking Cameron reduced the probability of voting in favour 
of electoral reform (p < .001), whereas liking Miliband or Clegg increased it (p < .001).  
Similarly, identification with the Conservative Party reduced the likelihood of a Yes vote, 
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whereas identification with Labour or the Liberal Democrats increased it.  Contact by the Yes 
to Fairer Votes organization significantly bolstered the probability of a Yes vote, whereas 
contact by No to AV reduced it. 
Regarding other predictors, the data in Table 3 show that most socio-demographic 
characteristics were insignificant.  There were two exceptions.  One was gender, with men 
being more likely to vote Yes than women (p < .001).  The other was residence in Scotland; 
with all other factors controlled, Scots were less likely to vote yes (p < .01) than were English 
(the country of residence reference category). 
Since the binomial logit functional form is nonlinear, the substantive impact of 
statistically significant predictor variables is not readily apparent from the coefficients in 
Table 3.  To provide intuition about the influence of various predictors, Figure 4 shows the 
effect on the probability of voting Yes of increasing a given predictor from its minimum to its 
maximum value while holding the other variables constant at their means.13  It is readily 
apparent that the cost-benefit scale has the largest impact on the Yes vote—changing this 
scale from its minimum to its maximum value increases the probability of voting yes by fully 
.99 points (on a 0-1 probability scale).  This huge shift reinforces the conjecture that 
perceptions of the (dis)advantages of a change in the system played a big part in explaining 
the results.  The effects of the other two cost-benefit variables, the democracy and 
traditionalism scales, are considerably smaller (+.15 and -.28 points, respectively), albeit 
nontrivial. 
(Figure 4 about here) 
Regarding the cognitive engagement model, Figure 4 indicates that political 
knowledge played the largest role in influencing the Yes vote, closely followed by interest in 
the referendum campaign.  Changes in the values of these two variables could change the 
probability of Yes vote by +.21 and +.09 points, respectively.  As far as the heuristics model 
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was concerned, increasingly positive views of Liberal Democrat Leader, Nick Clegg could 
increase the probability of a Yes vote by a substantial amount, +.32 points, whereas 
increasingly positive views of Conservative Leader, David Cameron, could decrease that 
probability by an equal amount.   The effect of changing feelings about Ed Miliband was 
smaller, +.16 points.  Party identification mattered as well, with Liberal Democratic 
identifiers being .15 points more likely than nonidentifiers (the party identification reference 
category) to support AV.  The effect of Conservative identification was somewhat less, -.11 
points, and, as expected, the effect of Labour identification was quite weak, -.05 points.  
Campaign effects were very modest, with contact by Yes to Fair Votes enhancing the 
probability of voting Yes by .05 points, and contact by No to Av lessening it by .03 points. 
Similarly small effects were associated with gender and country of residence; other things 
equal, men were .04 points more likely to vote Yes than were women. and residents of 
Scotland were -.04 points less likely to do so than were residents of England and Wales.  
In summary, the multivariate analysis documents that all four models contribute to 
explaining why some people voted in favour of electoral reform, whereas others voted against 
it.  The cost-benefit model stands out as highly influential.  Evaluations of the advantages and 
disadvantages of a change in the electoral system had large effects on referendum voting 
decisions.  Heuristics mattered too; consistent with earlier studies, leader images and 
partisanship had substantial effects on voting in the AV referendum.  In addition, as expected, 
cognitively engaged people were more likely to opt for reform.  Exposure to campaign 
contacting was influential as well, but the impact was quite modest.  The overall explanatory 
power of the multivariate model is suggested by its very sizable McKelvey R2 (.75), and its 
ability to correctly classify nearly 88 per cent of the voters correctly. 
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The Referendum in Retrospect 
One of the most obvious aspects of the AV referendum was the dismal turnout—only 
42.2 percent of the electorate bothered to cast a ballot.  Not only was this figure well off the 
already desultory level of participation (65.1 per cent) in the 2010 general election, it also 
was far below the 64.5 per cent turnout in the 1975 national referendum on Britain's 
continued membership in the European Community.  The low turnout in the AV referendum 
suggests substantial public disengagement and disaffection.  The rival campaigns clearly 
failed to mobilize a majority of the electorate and, as observed earlier, many people 
complained only a week before the balloting that they were not well-informed about what 
they were being called upon to decide.  
In the wake of the referendum, public negativity about it was prevalent.  When the 
BES post-referendum respondents were asked if there was a 'lot of mud-slinging' in the 
campaign, over three-fifths agreed and fewer than one in ten disagreed.  Participants in the 
post-referendum survey also were presented with four positive words and four negative ones 
and asked to give their reactions to the Yes and No campaigns.  Figure 5 documents that 
negative responses overshadowed positive ones by a substantial margin.  The tenor of 
reactions was particularly evident for the Yes campaign, with only 5 per cent describing the 
campaign as strong and 34 per cent saying it was weak.  Similarly, 13 per cent or less 
indicated the Yes effort was informative, positive and interesting, while 15 to 22 per cent said 
it was not informative, negative and boring.  Overall, only 24 per cent designated one or more 
positive words to describe the Yes campaign and 53 per cent used one or more negative 
words.   Reactions to the No campaign were only slightly more upbeat and, overall, 34 per 
cent made one or more positive remarks, and 44 per cent made one or more negative ones.   
(Figure 5 about here) 
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In retrospect, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the AV referendum was a 
decidedly unsuccessful and unhelpful exercise in direct democracy.  Despite repeated, if 
sometimes curious, efforts to inform people about the issues at stake in choosing an electoral 
system,14 the rival campaigns failed to inform and engage much of the electorate.  A majority 
of people did not go to the polls and, as observed, many judged the competing campaigns 
negatively.  This judgement reflected the harshly negative tenor of widely publicized attacks 
launched on each other by leading Yes and No advocates.15  Quite possibly, an important 
result is that the campaigns and the referendum outcome have contributed to growing sense 
that the British political system is seriously in need of reform.  The latter outcome would be 
ironic; by conspicuously failing to achieve reform, the AV referendum may have heightened 
public appreciation of the need for it, while making it more difficult to achieve.   We consider 
this possibility in the concluding section.  
Conclusion:  The Consequences of a Decisive No 
The decisive outcome of the AV referendum has settled the issue and the question of 
electoral reform is unlikely to be re-opened for many years.  If attempts are made to raise the 
issue again in the near future, opponents of reform will be able to say that the people have 
spoken and the question should no longer be up for discussion.  Had the vote been closer, 
then supporters of a fully proportional electoral system might be able to argue that this should 
be on the agenda in coalition negotiations if a future general election proves as inconclusive 
as the last one.  However, the strength of opposition to change in the electoral system 
manifest in the 2011 AV referendum makes this unlikely. 
 Another effect of the resounding rejection of electoral reform might be to inhibit 
attempts at other constitutional reforms such as an elected House of Lords and the devolution 
of power from Whitehall to local communities.  If so, this is unfortunate because data 
presented above indicates there is substantial support for change.  In addition, there is 
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mounting evidence to suggest that the political institutions which generate support for British 
democracy are failing in comparison with an earlier era (Whiteley, 2011).  Highly adverse  
public reactions to the MPs' expenses scandal and the recent News of the World phone 
hacking crimes are stark indicators of widespread discontent and lack of trust with the 
institutions and key actors in the contemporary British state.  This negativity is unlikely to 
dissipate in the near future.   
It can be argued that a loss of trust in key institutions such as Parliament and the 
Executive may encourage further use of referendums in the future.  When institutions and 
elite actors are no longer trusted, referendums might serve to provide the legitimacy needed 
for major decisions.  However, although BES survey evidence suggests there is substantial 
public support in the abstract for using referendums to decide important questions, the status 
quo bias discussed above is likely to be strong if people do not understand or are not engaged 
with the particular topic at issue.  This tendency will be strengthened if they do not trust 
political leaders and political parties to give them guidance.  There is a paradox that 
referendums are often called to settle constitutional questions that divide political parties, but 
almost by definition such issues are more likely to be seen as complicated and irrelevant to 
the lives of ordinary people in comparison with ‘bread-and-butter’ issues such as the 
economy and crime.  It required more than a generation for a nationwide referendum to occur 
after the 1975 vote on continued British membership in the European Community.  It is 
possible that the same thing may happen again. 
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Figure 1A.  Referendum Vote Intentions, January 2011 - May 2011 
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Figure 1B.  Referendum Vote Intentions, April 5th-May 4th, 2011 
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Source: Figure 1A: BES Monthly Continuous Monitoring Surveys and published YouGov 
polls asking actual referendum question; Figure 1B: daily random samples from the pre-
referendum wave of the BES AV Referendum survey. 
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Figure 2.  Yes Voting in the AV Referendum  
by Level of Political Knowledge 
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Figure 3.  Percentages Voting Yes in AV Referendum by Party Leader Images 
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Figure 4.  Changes in the Probability of Voting Yes Associated With 
Changes in Significant Predictor Variables 
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Figure 5.  Reactions to the Yes and No Campaigns 
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 Source: BES AV Referendum post-referendum survey.
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Table 1.  Attitudes the Alternative Vote and First-Past-The-Post Electoral Systems 
(Horizontal Percentages) 
 
Statement Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Neither 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
The AV system is fairer 
 
9 32 20 22 18 
AV gives too much influence to small 
parties 
13 28 25 26 9 
Outcomes under AV more accurately 
reflect opinions 
10 31 19 23 17 
 
AV makes MPs work harder 
 
10 
 
38 
 
25 
 
17 
 
11 
 
FPTP is part of the British tradition 
 
 
20 
 
22 
 
20 
 
21 
 
17 
FPTP allows voters to attribute 
responsibility to parties  
15 41 24 16 5 
 
AV is hard to understand  
7 30 23 28 13 
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Table 2.  Attitudes Towards Constitutional Change 
(Horizontal Percentages) 
 
 
Statement 
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Agree 
 
Neither 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
House of Lords should be elected 
 
24 37 19 14 6 
House of Commons should be 
reduced to 600 MPs 
30 40 18 8 3 
Local Government should have 
more authority 
11 47 28 13 3 
 
 
The Monarchy should be abolished 
 
9 
 
8 
 
13 
 
23 
 
48 
 
The Church of England should 
keep its status as a state institution 
 
26 
 
32 
 
24 
 
8 
 
9 
 
The UK should use referendums to 
decide important issues 
 
25 
 
42 
 
16 
 
13 
 
4 
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Table 3.  Binomial Logit Analysis of Yes Voting in AV Referendum 
    B    s.e. 
Cost-Benefit Scale  2.43*** 0.05 
Democracy Scale  0.11*** 0.03 
Traditionalism Scale -0.25*** 0.03 
Interest in Referendum  0.16*** 0.03 
Political Knowledge  0.14*** 0.02 
Attention to Politics  0.01 0.02 
Media Consumption of AV News -0.00 0.02 
Cameron Image -0.17*** 0.02 
Miliband Image  0.08*** 0.01 
Clegg Image  0.15*** 0.02 
Labour Identification -0.22** 0.09 
Conservative Identification -0.81*** 0.10 
Liberal Democrat Identification  0.37*** 0.12 
Other Party Identification -0.08 0.11 
Yes to Fairer Votes Campaign  0.25** 0.09 
No to Av Campaign -0.17* 0.08 
Gender (Male)  0.21*** 0.06 
Age  0.001 0.002 
Annual Family Income  0.01 0.01 
Education  0.15*** 0.02 
Scotland -0.22** 0.09 
Wales -0.19 0.13 
Constant -2.86*** 0.22 
McKelvey R2 .75  
Percentage Correctly Classified 87.9  
Lambda .70  
Log Likelihood -4111.80  
N  15,137  
* - p < .05; ** - p < .01; *** - p < .001; two-tailed tests for Scotland and Wales, one-tailed 
tests for other predictors. 
.
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Endnotes 
                                                            
1 See http://bes2009-10.org.  The authors wish to thank BPIX and the McDougall Trust for 
financial support that helped to make the referendum study possible.  We also thank Joe 
Twyman, Study Director at YouGov, for his generous assistance in facilitating the project. 
 
2 See http://bpix.co.uk/ 
 
3 The details of the political knowledge scale are discussed below. 
  
4 It noteworthy that in the 1975 referendum on continued UK membership in the European 
Community, the yes campaign held the status quo advantage since Britain had already joined 
the EC.  The division of the vote was: 67.2 per cent yes and 32.8 per cent no.  This level of 
endorsement of the status quo was virtually identical to that in the 2011 AV referendum. 
 
5 Gigerenzer illustrates this point with an amusing story.  A decision theorist from Columbia 
University was struggling whether to accept a job offer from another university.  His 
colleague advised him to maximise his utility, something which he regularly wrote about in 
his research. The decision theorist responded: ‘Come on, this is serious’ (2008: 20). 
 
6  On the efficacy of high quality internet surveys for modelling political behaviour in Britain, 
see Sanders et al. (2007).  See also Clarke et al. (2008).  Similar findings for the U.S. are 
presented in a recent study by Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2011).   
 
7  To measure opinion and vote intention dynamics in the run-up to the referendum, random 
samples were surveyed every day between April 5th and May 4th.  The average size of these 
daily samples was N = 732. 
 
8 If predictor variables are measured well before a response variable, then it is unlikely that 
the latter is influencing the former (Kennedy, 2003: 301-315). 
 
9 These items were included in the second wave of the survey for space reasons. 
 
10 The statements in the tables are summaries.  Actual question wording may be obtained 
from the survey questionnaires which may be downloaded from the BES website cited in note 
2.  The website also has a measurement appendix which discusses details of the construction 
of all the variables used in the analyses in this paper.  The survey data are available on the 
website for replication purposes and secondary analyses by BES user communities. 
 
11 The democracy and traditionalism factors explain 26.6 per cent and 25.1 per cent of the 
item variance, respectively. 
 
12  England is reference category. 
 
13 The simulations were performed using the Clarify programme available from Gary King’s 
website at Harvard University (http://gking.harvard.edu).    See Tomz, Wittenberg and King 
(2003). 
 
14  An amusing example is: 'Is Your Cat Confused About the Referendum on the Alternative 
Vote on 5th May'.  See www.youtube.com/watch?v=HiHuiDD_oTk 
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15  Illustrative are the heated exchanges between Baroness Warsi and Chris Huhne concerning 
campaign financing and whether AV or FPTP would do the most to facilitate the fortunes of 
extreme parties such as the BNP. 
     
